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Recent academic work, mainstream media, and policy debate has noted with concern that
public pension funds, in aggregate, face a funding gap in the order of trillions of dollars.5 Academic
research on public pension plans has largely focused on exploring these funding gaps, with
particular attention paid to how various assumptions such as the discount rate affect the magnitude
of these funding gaps, and how the funding gaps affect plan-level asset allocation and risk taking.
(see, e.g., Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009; Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers, 2017). Less attention has
been paid to the factors that affect the investment performance of these pension plans. This dearth
of attention comes even though any future shortfalls arising from funding gaps could be mitigated
by better plan performance. Our study attempts to remedy this oversight by examining one factor
that could affect plan performance: manager compensation. Simply put, we examine whether
higher Chief Investment Officer (CIO) pay results in better performance, and if so, how, and why.
The link between executive compensation and performance has been studied in a wide
range of contexts (e.g. Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2019, Ibert et al, 2018, Murphy, 2012). The setting
of public pension plan CIOs is particularly well suited to such a study for several reasons. First,
CIOs’ compensation levels and structure can be observed through public databases and Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Second, plan performance is easily observable in the form of
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The funding gap, defined as the difference between the present values of their assets and liabilities is estimated in
the $1 to $3 trillion range. While total assets are estimated at $4.4 trillion based on observed market values, different
discount rates used to discount future liabilities leads to the large range in the funding gap. Pew Research suggests
that the gap exceeds $1 trillion: https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/06/the-statepension-funding-gap-2017. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) estimate that, when using proper actuarial assumptions, the
gap in June 2009 was between $1.26 and $2.49 trillion dollars. Additionally see “The Coming Pension Crisis Is So
Big That It's A Problem For Everyone,” Forbes, May 20th, 2019, and “A Plan to Avert the Pension Crisis,” The New
York Times, Aug 5th, 2013.

2

investment returns. Furthermore, given the availability of granular data on plans’ asset allocations,
allocation performance, and equity holdings, it is possible to identify specific sources of the
variation in performance across CIOs. This data rich setting, together with the potential
implications regarding how CIO compensation could mitigate the pressing issue of plan
underfunding, motivates our study.
Why might higher CIO compensation levels lead to better performance? We hypothesize
three channels: better hiring, improved retention, and the presence of incentives for more highly
compensated managers. While the links between higher compensation and better hiring and
retention outcomes are clear, we elaborate on the link between compensation, incentives, and
performance. It may be possible that higher compensation is associated with explicit or implicit
performance incentives and that any documented relation between higher compensation and
performance is driven by the presence of those incentives, rather than the compensation level itself.
Our data on the educational backgrounds of hired CIOs, incidence of CIO turnover, and the
breakdown of CIO compensation into specific components (e.g. bonus amounts, raises) allow us
to observe whether pay affects performance through better hiring, higher retention, or providing
better incentives.
Our main finding is that plans with higher paid CIOs generate significantly higher future
investment returns. Plans that pay their CIOs top quartile compensation significantly outperform
plans paying bottom quartile compensation by 47 – 60 bps annually. This result appears linear and
monotonic (see Figure 1) and is robust to the use of multiple alternative performance measures
(e.g., raw returns, Sharpe ratios).
We next explore the sources of outperformance for plans with higher paid CIOs. The results
of multivariate regressions suggest that about 42% of the 60 bp (approximately 25 bp)
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outperformance can be explained by other observable variables such as plans’ asset allocations,
plan size, and the presence of a separate investment board. Further analysis shows that higher paid
managers allocate significantly more of their portfolios to private equity and real estate (the highest
performing asset classes in our sample), and significantly less to commodities (the worst
performing asset class in our sample).
Better investment selection within asset classes also helps explain higher paid CIOs’
outperformance. Specifically, higher paid CIOs choose significantly better investments within the
private equity and real estate asset classes. This superior investment picking ability explains an
additional 23 bp of the remaining 35 bp of outperformance. While we are unable to precisely
identify the sources of the remaining 12 bp of outperformance, analysis of the equity holdings of
the subset of plans that file 13F disclosures suggests higher compensated CIOs appear less
susceptible to behavioral biases such as the disposition effect, holding lottery stocks, and overtrading which may help explain some of the remaining outperformance.
While our results indicate that higher compensation leads to better performance, this
finding may be driven by endogeneity. Specifically, it may be possible that our findings are driven
either by reverse causation or omitted variables. Reverse causation is unlikely, due to the difficulty
of predicting future returns and linking current compensation to such returns. However, to mitigate
even this unlikely possibility, we examine the effects of current compensation on performance two
years in the future. Our findings still hold, suggesting reverse causation is unlikely to be driving
our results.
Omitted variables are a more serious concern. Compensation levels are likely to be
correlated with many other variables that may affect performance. Factors such as plan size, risktaking, culture, location, level of resources, and independence of the investment function are some
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of a few things that could be correlated with compensation and could also affect performance. We
attempt to control for as many of these potential covariates as possible and note that our results are
robust to their inclusion in regressions. Moreover, our results still hold when using risk adjusted
measures of performance such as Sharpe ratio. 6 However, we also acknowledge that it is
impossible to control for all omitted variables and we caveat our results accordingly.
The results presented provide evidence that higher CIO compensation is associated with
better plan performance and that the primary sources of this outperformance appear to be better
asset allocation and security selection. Next, we examine why higher compensation leads to better
performance. We posit that higher compensation could lead to better hiring, improved retention,
or be correlated with the presence of incentives and examine each of these channels in turn.
To examine whether paying more leads to hiring more talented CIOs, we need a measure
of talent. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) use the quality of managers’ education as a proxy for ability
and talent. We collect data on the admission selectivity and the average SAT scores at the
managers’ undergraduate institutions and examine whether higher paying pension plans hire
managers who attended more prestigious schools. We find evidence supportive of this hypothesis.
Specifically, CIOs paid top quartile compensation graduate from undergraduate institutions with
64.60 point higher average SAT scores and 13.7% lower admission rates relative to the schools

6

For the subsample of plans that file 13F holdings reports, we also find that higher compensated managers take less
risk when we examine a wide variety of holdings-based risk measures and factors (VIX, MACRO, FIN, policy
uncertainty, VaR, etc.) and have higher risk adjusted performance measures.
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attended by managers in the lowest quartile of compensation. Moreover, we find that plan
performance is significantly higher for CIOs who went to more selective institutions.
Next, we examine whether plans that pay more are better able to retain their CIOs. We
estimate Cox proportional hazard models to predict voluntary CIO departure and find that plans
with lower CIO compensation experience higher CIO turnover. Additionally, measures of both
realized and predicted CIO turnover are negatively related to future performance. Thus, it appears
that improved retention is one channel through which higher compensation leads to better
performance.
A third possibility is that the compensation contracts of higher paid CIOs also contain
performance incentives and the presence of performance incentives, rather than the level of
compensation, that drives the link between higher compensation and better plan performance. To
examine this hypothesis, we first confirm that higher pay is correlated with the presence of
incentives in our sample. Indeed, 43.1% of plans with CIO compensation in the top quartile pay a
bonus constituting 20% or more of total compensation compared to only 3.8% of plans in the
bottom quartile of compensation. However, when examining the link between future performance
and both compensation level and the presence of incentive pay simultaneously, we find that future
performance is only significantly linked to overall levels of pay.7

7

A similar result holds when examining the link between overall pay-for-performance sensitivity (termed PPS and
measured as the slope of a regression of total compensation on previous year’s performance) and overall compensation
levels.
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Together, these results suggest that higher CIO compensation leads to better performance
in public pension plans. In terms of economic magnitude, our results imply that a $350,150
increase in annual CIO compensation leads to 47 – 60 bps higher investment returns per year.
These higher investment returns translate to an additional $74.91 – $95.63 million of economic
value each year for the average plan in our sample. Thus, it appears that higher CIO compensation
is a good deal for public pension plans.8 For this reason, it is important to ask why lower paying
plans do not offer higher compensation.
We attempt to answer this question by analyzing determinants of CIO compensation,
paying particular attention to potential frictions in the CIO labor market. Consistent with findings
documented in Dyck, Manoel, and Morse (2021), we find that plans headquartered in Democrat
leaning areas and states with higher corruption levels pay less. To gain further insight into this
labor market, we also analyze the subset of CIOs who move between public pension plans. First,
CIOs who move between plans are underpaid, relative to the size of the plans they manage, in 77%
of the cases we observe. Second, CIOs receive large increases in compensation and are no longer
more likely to be underpaid after they move. Third, CIOs with local ties and longer tenure at a
given plan are less likely to move. Together, these results suggest that demand side frictions (e.g.,
underpayment by plans headquartered in Democratic leaning areas) and supply side frictions (e.g.,
local ties making it difficult for CIOs to move) contribute to some plans persistently offering low
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This back of the envelope likely understates the true cost of increased compensation. For instance, increased CIO
compensation would likely be accompanied by other costs such as increased compensation for the entire investment
staff and additional resources such as data and travel. However, given the large size of these pension plans and the
magnitude of the outperformance, it is likely that benefits still exceed the total costs associated with increased CIO
compensation.
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compensation. However, the plan-to-plan moves we observe help resolve some situations in which
CIOs are underpaid. We discuss the implications of these results further in our conclusions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains our discussion of the extant literature
and our paper’s contribution to it. Section 3 describes the data and variables we use in our analysis.
Section 4 examines the relation between compensation and plan performance and the explanations
for this relation. Section 5 examines the labor market for pension plan CIOs. Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Contribution
Our main contribution is to document a positive link between compensation and
performance in the unified setting of pension plan investment management. The pension plan
setting has advantages over other settings used in the extant literature. For example, while Dal Bo
et al (2013) use a natural experiment to show that higher levels of compensation can attract more
talented workers, they are unable to link better hiring with higher productivity on the job. Our
setting is advantageous in that regard as we can observe pension plan CIOs’ productivity (e.g.,
their investment performance). The use of corporations as the setting for pay-performance analysis
suffers from several well-documented endogeneity concerns.9 For example, CEOs often set their
own pay or reset the terms of their incentive compensation when it is advantageous for them do
so. Additionally, CEOs may have significant stock ownership and draw insignificant levels of
salary, which can contaminate analyses (Chhaochharia, and Grinstein, 2009; Guthrie, Sokolowsky,
and Wan, 2012). Our setting avoids many of these issues.
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See the executive compensation literature reviews by Murphy (2012) for longer discussions of these endogeneity
concerns.
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The public pension plan setting also has several advantages over similar studies in the asset
management setting. Although the asset management setting is arguably cleaner than that of
corporate finance, it also has drawbacks. First, asset manager compensation in the United States is
not publicly available which means researchers must estimate it using assumptions. For instance,
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) estimate the magnitude of the performance incentives (e.g., the
“delta”) of hedge fund managers by assuming that managers reinvest all fees into their funds.
Second, managers of some vehicles (e.g., hedge funds) can, and do, change their own
compensation contracts (Agarwal and Ray, 2012; Deuskar et al, 2012). Finally, asset managers
also have incentives other than the compensation they receive. Specifically, asset managers often
invest in their own funds (e.g., Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2019; Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009)
and face the indirect incentives provided by investor flows (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016;
Yin, 2016).
Reiterated, the public pension plan setting has distinct advantages over these other settings.
First, pension plan CIOs are government employees and seem to have little power to set their own
compensation or choose board members. Second, pension plan CIOs do not possess the
performance incentives stemming from investor flows or personal ownership in the plan itself.
Specifically, public pension plans are retirement investment vehicles that are funded with
mandatory employee and government contributions that cannot be withdrawn and represent a
small percentage of a given employee’s total compensation. Third, because these CIOs are
government employees, we can observe the actual dollar figure of compensation they receive as
well as the specifics of how that compensation is paid (salary, bonuses, etc.). Lastly, because
pension plan performance and individual investments are publicly available, we can also observe
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the productivity and performance of the CIOs. Combined, the features of the public pension plan
setting make it more ideal to study the relation between manager pay and performance.
Our second contribution is the counterintuitive finding that incentive pay, by itself, does
not lead to better performance. This finding resonates with some academic literature in
management and economics showing that incentive pay may not be the best way to motivate
workers. 10 For example, Glucksberg (1962) provides evidence that incentives can reduce
effectiveness in solving problems requiring creativity. More generally, many studies find that
humans have high intrinsic levels of motivation for activities requiring insights and creativity,
while extrinsic motivation (i.e., incentive pay) may be required for more mundane tasks (Deci,
1971). Furthermore, extrinsic motivation may eventually crowd out intrinsic motivation (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2003). To the extent managing a pension plan’s assets requires creativity and insight,
our study reinforces these findings. Incentive pay does not appear to drive outperformance in this
area. Our study documents a real-life analog to these experimental and theoretical studies and
supports the observation that incentive compensation may simply be used to justify overall higher
levels of compensation.11
Our final contribution is to the literature on public pension plan performance. This
literature can be divided in two smaller groups. First, several studies examine the performance of

10

See the survey by Pink (2009) for a summary of this research.
As Bob Jacksha, CIO of The New Mexico Educational Retirement Board, notes, “[f]rom a public relations
standpoint, if you give someone a high flat salary, the public might say you're not earning it, but incentive pay is tied
to an outcome.” See “Public CIO pay getting renewed attention,” Pensions & Investments, July 23, 2018, available at
https://www.pionline.com/article/20180723/PRINT/180729976/public-cio-pay-getting-renewed-attention
11
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pension funds as a group (Coronado, Engen, and Knight, 2003; Ennis, 2020). The main finding of
these studies is that public pension plans underperform passive benchmarks.
The second strand of the literature on public pension performance focuses on the factors
that influence these plans’ performance such as political influence and the plan’s funding level.
For example, researchers have documented that public pension plans overweight their portfolios
with local investments which negatively affect plan performance (Bradley, Pantzalis, and Yuan,
2016; Brown, Pollet, and Weisbenner, 2015; Hochberg and Rauh, 2013; Andonov, Hochberg, and
Rauh, 2018). Studies have also linked the level of underfunding to excess risk taking and worse
performance (Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers, 2017). Dyck, Manoel, and Morse (2021) study the
role that political outrage over executive compensation plays in a public pension plan’s
performance and find that plans subject to higher levels of outrage suffer worse performance.
Interestingly, little attention has been paid to the role of the pension plan manager (e.g., the CIO)
in the plan’s performance despite the large literature on how managers themselves impact fund
performance.

3. Data and Summary Statistics
3.1. Data and Variable Construction
Our primary data source is the Public Plans database (henceforth PPD) created by the
Center of Retirement Research at Boston College. The PPD data contains plan-level data for 190
state and local pension plans from 2001 through 2018.12 The data contains information on plans’
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The data can be found here at https://publicplansdata.org/.
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assets, asset allocations, liabilities, investment returns, actuarial assumptions, and many other
variables. According to the Center for Retirement Research, these 190 plans represent 95 percent
of public pension membership and assets nationwide.
Our main performance measure is Peer-Adjusted Return which we calculate by subtracting
the average return of the other plans during the same fiscal year from a plan’s annual investment
return. We also calculate a plan’s Sharpe Ratio as its average annual return divided by the standard
deviation of those annual returns using periods of 4 years of return data.
We augment the PPD dataset with information from the plans’ comprehensive annual
financial reports (CAFRs). Specifically, we construct an indicator variable, Separate Investment
Board, equal to 1 if the plan has a separate investment board tasked with monitoring the investment
functions of the plan and 0 otherwise. We conduct internet searches (e.g., LinkedIn, Google
searches) to obtain biographical information on the sample of CIOs. Specifically, we collect data
on CIOs’ undergraduate institutions, ages, and tenures. We collect measures of the quality of the
CIOs’ academic institutions (CIO Institution SAT Score and CIO Institution Admission Rate) from
the College Board. We define an indicator variable, CIO Local, equal to 1 if the CIO attended high
school or college in the same state in which he manages a given plan and 0 otherwise.
We also construct two variables based on the plans’ locations. The first variable, Financial
Center, follows Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) and is an indicator variable equal to 1 for
plans located in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, and
0 otherwise. The second variable, Top Quartile MSA, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a plan
is headquartered in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) whose population is in the top quartile
of the MSAs in which our plans are headquartered and 0 otherwise.
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Most importantly, to obtain information on the CIOs’ compensation, we submitted FOIA
requests to the state, county, or municipality responsible for each plan’s administration.
Specifically, we requested “The a) first name, b) last name, c) job title and d) compensation
received by all pension system investment staff in fiscal years 2001 to 2018, broken out by all
applicable compensation types – including but not limited to net annual salary, bonuses, deferred
compensation, and matched profit sharing, and any other compensation.” Many states changed
payroll systems during this period and were unable to provide us data all the way back to 2001.
On average, we received 12 years of data from each of our 102 respondents.
In several cases, one set of investment officers is responsible for multiple plans. For
example, the Bureau of Asset Management, housed in the New York City Comptroller’s office, is
responsible for the investment management of five distinct plans: the Teachers’ Retirement
System, the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, the New York City Police Pension
Fund, the New York City Fire Pension fund, and the New York City Board of Education
Retirement System. Our current sample contains CIO compensation data for 1,660 plan-years from
122 distinct plans. Many pension plans do not have a chief investment officer; these plans simply
outsource the investment management to outside managers based on the recommendations of
investment consultants. These plans are excluded from our analysis.13
3.2. Summary Statistics
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The composition of our sample can be found in Table A1 of the Online Appendix.
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We report summary statistics in Table 1. The average (median) CIO in our sample earns
$263,043.90 ($207,422.80) in total compensation per year during our sample period. The CIO in
the 90th percentile of compensation earns $504,854.80 while a CIO in the 10th percentile earns
$105,000 which indicates that there is a large amount of variation in the compensation paid to
public pension plan CIOs. CIOs earn bonuses in 15.8% of all plan-years in our sample; the average
bonus in these years is $111,396.90. The average CIO in our sample attended a university with an
average undergraduate SAT score of 1272 and an admission rate of 54%. The average CIO is
approximately 51 years old and the average tenure for a CIO at a public pension plan is 6.33 years.
CIOs voluntarily leave their funds in 6.00% of fund-years while they are only fired in 1.1% of
fund-years.14
(insert Table 1 about here)
The average (median) plan in our sample has assets with a market value of $22.16 billion
($10.83 billion), is funded at 76.44% (76.38%) and generates an annual return of 6.96% (9.30%).
Finally, these plans allocate an average of 51.75% to equities, 26.42% to fixed income securities,
and 10.99% to alternative assets such as hedge funds and private equity funds. During our sample
period, the average annual returns to private equity (11.40%) and real estate (8.97%) were the
highest while the returns for investing in commodities (3.43%) and hedge funds (4.63%) were the
lowest.

4. Empirical Results
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CIO retirements and deaths explain the remaining turnover implied by the average 6.33-year tenure.
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In this section, we first document the relation between CIO compensation and plan
performance. Next, we attempt to uncover the sources of highly paid CIOs' outperformance.
Finally, we investigate the three channels that may explain our baseline results: hiring, retention,
and incentives.
4.1. Main Result
We begin by conducting univariate analysis by sorting the CIOs into quartiles each year
based on the level of their total compensation. We then calculate the average performance of the
plans run by CIOs in each quartile in the next year and compare the difference in average
performance for the highest and lowest quartiles. We also present the average compensation paid
to CIOs in each compensation quartile to aid in interpreting the economic magnitude of the results.
The results are presented in Table 2.
(insert Table 2 about here)
First, the average plan performance is monotonically increasing with each compensation
quartile. Second, plans with CIO compensation in the lowest compensation quartile underperform
their peers by a statistically significant 0.215% per year. Third, plans with CIO compensation in
the top quartile outperform their peers by a statistically significant 0.251% per year. Finally, the
difference between the top and bottom quartile groups is a 0.466% per year and is statistically
significant at the 1% level (t-stat = 3.34).
The univariate sort analysis above does not explore the functional relationship between
pension performance and compensation. This relation is important from a policy perspective as
one can imagine additional compensation having differential effects for CIO positions at different
points on the compensation distribution. For instance, it is possible that increasing compensation
an additional $5,000 for a position currently paying $105,000 per year (i.e., the 10th percentile in

15

our sample) may not be enough to attract the requisite talent to boost returns. To explore this
relation, we use Stata’s binscatter function to plot plan performance versus the log of CIO
compensation after controlling for year fixed effects.15 We present the illustration in Figure 1.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
The figure shows that the relation between CIO compensation and plan performance is
fairly linear which suggests that our main result is not driven by any particular portion of the
compensation domain. The figure also mitigates potential concerns over the use of a linear
regression specification for our subsequent multivariate tests.
4.2. Sources of Outperformance
In this section, we explore the ways higher paid CIOs generate higher investment returns.
To begin this analysis, we estimate a series of multivariate regressions of pension plan performance
on the log of CIO compensation and various sets of control variables. It is important to note that
for these regressions we restrict the sample to the subset of plan-year observations for which we
have zero missing variables so that we can gauge how the inclusion of a given covariate(s) affects
the coefficient on log compensation without the potentially conflating effect of changes in sample
size. This constraint reduces our sample size from 1,470 observations in Table 2 to 1,141
observations in Table 3. The results of these regressions are contained in Table 3.
(insert Table 3 about here)
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Information on the binscatter function can be found at: https://michaelstepner.com/binscatter/ . We thank the referee
for this helpful suggestion.
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Column 1 of Table 3 contains the results of a regression of plan performance on only the
log of CIO compensation and year fixed effects. The coefficient on log compensation in Column
1 is 0.477. We note that the coefficient on compensation in the base regression of performance on
compensation and year fixed effects in Table 3 implies a difference of 60 bps of outperformance
(the coefficient of 0.477 multiplied between the difference in log compensation, 1.26, for the top
and bottom quartiles of compensation). This 60 bp difference is slightly higher than difference of
47 bps we find using the unrestricted sample as shown in Table 2.
In columns 2 – 4 of Table 3, we begin augmenting this regression with additional
covariates. Specifically, we estimate the following linear regression:
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ′ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 ′ 𝑌𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(1)

where i indexes plans, j indexes CIOs, and t indexes time. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is plan i’s peeradjusted performance at time t and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of plan i’s CIO
compensation at time t – 1. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of plan or location characteristics, 𝑌𝑗,𝑡−1 is a vector
of CIO characteristics, and 𝜑𝑡 denotes year fixed effects. The standard errors are double clustered
by plan and year.
In the second column of Table 3, we augment our regression by including the prior year’s
plan performance, the lag of plan size, and the lag of the plan’s funding level. The latter two
variables are included as prior research has shown that larger pension plans outperform smaller
plans (Dyck and Pomorski, 2011) and that funding level affects plans’ risk-taking (e.g., Andonov,
Bauer, and Cremers, 2017). The inclusion of these three variables reduces the coefficient on log
compensation to 0.347. In Column 3, we add the plan’s allocations to various asset classes to the
regression. The inclusion of these variables lowers the coefficient on log compensation to 0.289.
Finally, in Column 4, we add in indicator variables equal to 1 when the plan has a separate
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investment board, its CIO attended a college in the top quartile of acceptance selectivity, and it is
headquartered in a financial center. The inclusion of these variables decreases our coefficient from
0.289 to 0.278.
There are several takeaways from the regressions in Table 3. First, the added covariates
explain approximately 42% of the total effect that compensation has on plan performance (i.e., the
coefficient on compensation goes down from 0.477 to 0.278). Second, these regressions help
identify potential sources of the outperformance we document. For instance, greater allocations to
private equity, equity, and real estate are associated with higher peer-adjusted returns.16
We next test whether CIO compensation is related to asset allocation. We regress plans’
allocations to individual asset classes on the log of CIO compensation and year fixed effects. We
present the results of these regressions in Panel A of Table 4.
(insert Table 4 about here)
The results of these regressions provide strong evidence that asset allocation is one source
of highly paid CIOs’ outperformance. Specifically, we find that highly paid CIOs allocate more of
their portfolios to private equity and real estate. Our results imply that CIOs in the top quartile of
compensation allocate approximately 3.4% more of their portfolios to private equity and 2.4%
more to real estate relative to CIOs in the lowest quartile of compensation. Because private equity
and real estate are the two asset classes with the highest average returns during our sample period,
plans that allocated greater percentages of their portfolios to these classes outperformed their peers
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This finding is consistent with Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) who find that asset allocation explains approximately
40% of the cross-sectional variation in pension plan performance.
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on average. CIOs in the top quartile of compensation also allocate about 0.8% less of their
portfolios to commodities, which was the worst performing asset class during our sample period,
when compared with those in the lowest compensation quartile.
We next attempt to explain the remaining 58% of the effect compensation has on plan
performance. In addition to allocating to asset classes with higher average returns, highly paid
CIOs may also impact performance by picking higher returning assets within a given asset class.
We explore this possibility by estimating regressions of each plan’s asset class returns on the log
of CIO compensation and year fixed effects and present our findings in Panel B of Table 4. The
results suggest that highly paid CIOs choose better assets in both the private equity and real estate
classes. Specifically, our results suggest that the CIOs in the top quartile of compensation
outperform those in the lowest quartile of compensation in these classes by between 1.1 – 2.0%
per year.
Consider a CIO in the highest quartile of compensation. The average allocation to private
equity (real estate) for CIOs in this group is 7.7% (7.0%). On average, our results imply that the
highest paid CIOs’ superior asset selection skills would lead to outperformance in their private
equity (real estate) allocations of 2.0% (1.1%) per year. Thus, superior asset selection in private
equity (real estate) can explain approximately 15 bps (8 bps) of the remaining outperformance of
top quartile CIOs. Together the outperformance in private equity and real estate explains about
approximately 66% of the remaining coefficient in Table 3, Column 4.17
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As mentioned above, the coefficient in column 1 of Table 3 implies a difference of 60 bps between the performance
of plans run by the highest and lowest paid CIOs. The coefficient of 0.278 in column 4 implies that 58% of these 60

19

Next, we also investigate the possibility that highly paid pension plan CIOs possess asset
class timing ability. To do so, we regress the average returns to a given asset class each year on
the log of CIO compensation, a plan’s change in allocation to that asset class, and the interaction
of asset class changes and compensation. We find no evidence that public pension plan CIOs,
whether highly paid or not, possess any timing ability as changes to asset class allocations have no
predictive power for the returns of that asset class.18
Lastly, we investigate other potential sources for the remaining outperformance using the
equity holdings of the subsample of public pension plans who file 13F forms with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). We manually match the plans in our sample to the SEC
EDGAR database and find 23 pension plans who combine to file 1,054 13Fs over our sample
period. Examining the plans’ equity holdings allows us to provide more evidence of the actions
CIOs take to influence investment performance.
We calculate several measures of behavioral bias. Portfolio Turnover follows Barber and
Odean (2000, 2001). % Lottery Stocks Held is the percentage of the plan’s equity portfolio that is
made up of stocks classified as lottery stocks using the Kumar (2009) definition. 19 Finally,
Disposition is defined as in Odean (1998) and captures investors’ habit of holding on to losses too
long and realizing gains too quickly. Specifically, Disposition is equal to the percentage of losses

bps (35 bps) remain unexplained. Outperformance in private equity and real estate accounts for 23 out of these
remaining 35 bps, or 65.7%.
18
For brevity, we do not tabulate these results but they are available upon request.
19
Kumar (2009) considers a stock to be a lottery stock if it is in the lowest 50th stock price percentile at the end of the
previous month, the highest 50th idiosyncratic volatility percentile (using the past 6 months of daily returns), and the
highest 50th percentile of idiosyncratic skewness (using the past 6 months of daily returns) where each sort is conducted
independently.

20

realized minus the percentage of gains realized such that a higher number means a manager is less
prone to this bias. Each of the three behavioral biases has been shown to be detrimental to
investment performance.
We compare the propensity of CIOs in each quartile of compensation to fall victim to these
three measures of behavioral bias and present the results in Table 5. The results indicate that higher
paid CIOs are less prone to behavior biases. Higher paid CIOs trade less frequently, hold fewer
lottery stocks, and are less prone to the disposition effect. For instance, CIOs in the highest quartile
of compensation have annual portfolio turnover of 21.0% while those in the lowest quartile have
turnover equal to 31.9%. The highest paid CIOs hold just 2.84% of their portfolios in lottery stocks
while the lowest paid CIOs hold 6.41% of their portfolios in lottery stocks.20 Finally, although the
most highly paid CIOs realize 2.7% more of their gains than their losses, CIOs in the lowest
quartile of compensation realize 9.1% more of their gains than they do their losses. Each of the
differences mentioned are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Our results using
holdings-based measures provide evidence that highly paid CIOs are less likely to engage in
behaviors that adversely affect performance. However, given that this analysis only covers a subset
of plans, we are hesitant to quantitatively link these results to the overall magnitude of 60 bps of
outperformance discussed above.
(insert Table 5 about here)
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Our results on lottery stocks are robust to the use of the MAX measure of Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) to
define lottery stocks.
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Combined, the results in this section provide evidence that highly paid CIOs generate
higher investment returns than their peers and that much of that outperformance can be explained
by better asset class allocations and superior investment selection within asset classes. It appears
that an avoidance of behavioral biases may also explain some of the remaining outperformance.
4.3. Tests to Address Endogeneity Concerns
Although our baseline results suggest a strong relation between CIO compensation and
plan performance, this finding may be driven by reverse causality or omitted variables. We begin
by exploring the possibility that the relation between future performance and current compensation
is driven by reverse causality. Although this seems unlikely due to the difficulty in predicting
future investment returns and using those returns to determine current CIO compensation, we
nevertheless attempt to rule out this possibility by examining the link between a plan’s
performance two years in the future and its CIO’s current compensation. We present the results of
these regressions in Panel A of Table A2 in the Online Appendix. The coefficients on
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−2 are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better. These
tests help rule out the possibility that future performance is driving current compensation as it
seems implausible that pension plans are basing current compensation on performance two years
in the future.
More concerning is the potential for omitted variables to be driving our observed link
between CIO compensation and fund performance. One example of an omitted variable may be
risk taking. Specifically, it could be that the positive relation we document between compensation
and performance is driven by higher paid CIOs simply taking more risk. While our prior
regressions control for allocation percentages to different asset classes, there may be other ways
to increase risk (e.g., investing in riskier securities within a given asset class). To further mitigate
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this concern, we re-estimate Equation 1 using Sharpe Ratio as our dependent variable. Specifically,
Sharpe Ratio is equal to a plan’s average annual return divided by the standard deviation of these
annual returns for the previous 4 years. We present the results of these regressions in Panel B of
Table A2. The results continue to indicate a positive and statistically significant relation between
CIO compensation and plan performance, regardless of the performance measure chosen.21
We further examine plans’ risk taking by examining their equity holdings. Specifically, we
infer the daily, or monthly, equity returns of each plan for a given quarter using their reporting
holdings at the end of the previous quarter. We then use these inferred returns to measure plans’
exposures to a variety of risk and mispricing measures. First, we regress these returns on factors
including: i) VIX and VXO, ii) the systemic risk measure (CATFIN) of Allen, Bali, and Tang
(2012), iii) the macroeconomic risk measure of Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014), iv) the
economic policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), v) the behavioral risk
factors, PEAD and FIN, of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2020), and the vi) stock-level mispricing
score of Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2015). We also calculate plans’ vii) exposure to lottery stocks
by calculating their MAX return following Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011), viii) idiosyncratic
and total volatility, and ix) exposure to tail risk by calculating the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and
conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) using the inferred equity returns.
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We also estimate multivariate regressions using different specifications for our compensation variable. Specifically,
we use indicator variables for each compensation quartile, a single indicator variable for top quartile compensation,
and an indicator variable for above median compensation. The results of these tests can be found in Table A2, Panel
C and uniformly provide evidence of a positive relation between compensation and performance.
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We then regress these factor loadings or risk variables on the log of CIO compensation and
our plan-level control variables and present the results in Table A3. The results uniformly suggest
that highly paid CIOs take less risk in their equity portfolios. In total, our analysis in Tables A2
and A3 provides strong evidence that highly paid CIOs are not generating higher returns simply
by taking more risk.22
There are several other omitted variables that could be driving our results. First, higher
CIO compensation could be a proxy for better plan governance or culture. Andonov, Hochberg,
and Rauh (2018) find that the composition of a plan’s board of directors impacts its performance.
Thus, it is possible that the plan’s governance, rather its CIO’s compensation, is driving the relation
between compensation and fund performance. We use the presence of a separate investment board
(i.e., our Separate Investment Board indicator) as a measure of governance and investigate whether
this structure is driving our results. A second potential omitted variable that could be driving our
result is plan location. Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) find that mutual funds based in large
cities or financial centers outperform and attribute this effect to knowledge spillovers and learning.
Thus, it is possible that the relation we document between compensation and performance is being
driven by highly paid CIOs who work in big cities and learn from other money managers. We use
our two indicator variables, Financial Center and Top Quartile MSA, to control for this possibility.
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We also examine the possibility that plans run by highly paid CIOs use more derivatives and that this usage helps
explain our performance results. The overall magnitude of derivatives usage is likely too small to explain highly paid
CIOs’ outperformance. For brevity, we do not tabulate these results but they are available upon request.
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We note that our regression in Column 4 of Table 3 included these variables and continued to show
a positive and statistically relation between compensation and future performance.23
Lastly, while it is tempting to explore using exogenous shocks to CIO compensation to
provide a cleaner identification strategy, two issues preclude such analysis. First, the time horizon
required to translate any shock in CIO compensation into better hiring outcomes makes it difficult
to precisely examine the effects of shocks. Second, finding instances of exogenous shocks to CIO
compensation is a difficult task. One such change is the Arizona Legislature's amendment of State
Statute 38-611.01 in 2013 that allowed public agencies to pay incentive compensation to
investment related personnel which, in turn, significantly increased CIO compensation.
Immediately after the passage of the law, the CIO of the Arizona State Retirement System began
receiving a bonus of approximately $40,000. Unfortunately, we could not find enough of these law
changes to conduct meaningful analysis.
4.4. Better Hiring, Improved Retention, or Incentives?
In this section, we turn our attention to investigating why higher CIO compensation leads
to better performance. As discussed earlier, we posit that there are three channels that may explain
this relation. The first, hiring, predicts that paying higher compensation would help plans attract
more capable or talented managers. The second channel, retention, hypothesizes that plans that
pay more will be less likely to lose a CIO to a voluntary departure. Lastly, the incentives channel
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For each potential omitted variable discussed above, we also estimated our base regression (e.g., the one presented
in Column 4 of Table 3) for the 0 and 1 groups separately as well as with each potential omitted variable included
individually. We continue to find positive and statistically significant relations between performance and CIO
compensation for each group regardless of the specification. These results can be found in Table A4 in the Online
Appendix.
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conjectures that the higher level of compensation we observe is driven by higher incentive
compensation and that is the incentive component, rather than the overall level, of the
compensation that leads to higher performance. We investigate each channel individually below,
starting with the incentive channel as it is the most complex of the three channels.
4.4.1. Does the Structure of CIO Compensation Impact Performance?
In this section, we explore the possibility that highly paid CIOs outperform their lower paid
counterparts because of the sensitivity of their compensation to performance rather than the overall
compensation level. We call this the incentives channel. Specifically, we investigate whether
higher compensation is associated with i) higher termination risk as function of poor performance
or ii) explicit performance incentives (e.g., a bonus).
First, we explore the possibility that higher paid CIOs have higher termination risk. If true,
this finding would suggest that CIOs are incentivized to outperform their counterparts in part
because they are motivated to not lose their jobs, and their high salaries. To conduct this analysis,
we investigated every CIO turnover event in our sample and classified each as being a retirement,
poaching, firing, or a death. Our analysis reveals that CIO firings are exceedingly rare. In fact,
there are only 20 instances in which a CIO is explicitly fired or resigns with no mention of a new
job. Moreover, most of these terminations are the direct result of corrupt or outright illegal
behavior. 24 Nevertheless, we model the likelihood a CIO is fired using the following linear
probability model:
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See the following cases as examples: Fred Buenrostro of CALPERS: https://calpensions.com/2016/06/06/calpersex-ceo-sentenced-but-probe-continues; David Loglisci of New York Common Retirement Fund:
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𝐶𝐼𝑂 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑋 ′ 𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(2)

where 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is either the log of the CIO’s total compensation or an indicator
variable equal to 1 for CIOs in the top quartile of compensation. 𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of plan and CIO
characteristics that includes plan past performance, plan size, plan funding, CIO Local, CIO
Tenure, and CIO Age. We also include year fixed effects in these regressions. Our coefficient of
interest is 𝛽2, as this coefficient captures the impact of a CIO’s compensation on his likelihood to
be terminated for poor performance. The results are presented in Table 6, Panel A.
The results indicate that the termination risk CIOs face is not related to the level of their
compensation. The coefficients, 𝛽2 , on the interaction variable, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 ×
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ,

are

statistically

insignificant.

Moreover,

the

coefficients

on

𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 are also negative and statistically insignificant, which provides evidence
against the idea that highly paid CIOs face greater termination risk, independent of their investment
performance. We interpret these results as evidence that is unsupportive of the incentives channel.
Another possibility is that highly paid CIOs also have high levels of performance-based
compensation. That is, it may be that CIOs who are attempting to maximize their incentive
compensation are those who are outperforming their counterparts. As discussed earlier, the data
the pension plans provided us break the CIO’s compensation into net annual salary, bonuses, and

https://www.pionline.com/article/20121009/ONLINE/121009860/no-jail-time-or-probation-for-former-new-yorkstate-common-cio; Patricia Gerrick of North Carolina Pension: https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/newquestions-surround-ousted-treasury-official-and-fund-managers/
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deferred compensation components. We use this data to construct two measures of incentive-based
pay. The first measure, 20% Bonus, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the plan has ever paid its
CIO a bonus equal to 20% of his total compensation in the past, and 0 otherwise. 25 We also
construct a second indicator variable, PPS, that considers the possibility that some CIOs receive
implicit performance-based pay in the form of salary increases based on their past performance
(Murphy, 2012).
Specifically, for a given plan year, we use all prior return and compensation observations
to determine whether the CIO’s pay relates to his performance. Specifically, for each CIO-year,
we estimate the following regression:
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽1 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐼𝑂𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(3)

We include plan size and CIO tenure in the regression as it is well-known that CIOs with longer
tenures and those working for larger plans earn higher compensation (Binfare and Harris, 2020).
PPS is equal to 1 for plan-years in which i) 𝛽1 is greater than 0 and ii) statistically significant at
the 5% level or better, and 0 otherwise. We estimate rolling regressions to allow for the possibility
that some plans begin paying their CIOs performance-based compensation at different points in
time. Our PPS variable is equal to 1 in 19.15% of all plan-years. This relatively low figure is
consistent with industry publications suggesting that performance-based pay was rare for public
pension plan CIOs during most of our sample.
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We also used 10% and 50% as our threshold bonus values and found qualitatively similar results.
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We find that both measures of incentive compensation are positively correlated with total
compensation. 26 To examine whether it is the presence of incentive compensation, rather than
overall compensation level that explains our main result, we re-estimate our main regression
specification in Equation 1 after augmenting it with the two incentive compensation indicator
variables, Bonus20 and PPS. Panel B of Table 6 contains the results. We continue to find a positive
and statistically significant relation between total CIO compensation and plan performance even
with the inclusion of these proxies for incentive compensation. Moreover, neither Bonus20 nor
PPS has a statistically significant effect on plan performance.27
(Insert Table 6 about here)
Combined, the results in this section do not provide evidence in support of the incentives
channel. These results are consistent with press articles suggesting that plans use incentive
compensation to mitigate concerns that the public may believe that CIOs are paid too highly and
have not earned their compensation.28
4.4.2. Does Higher Compensation Attract CIOs of Higher Ability?
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The correlations of Bonus20 and PPS with total compensation are 0.47 and 0.04, respectively.
This result is consistent with analysis by compensation consulting firms and industry professionals. Specifically,
compensation consulting firm McLagan notes in their report for the Wyoming Retirement System in 2018 that “After
reviewing annual reports, board minutes, and plan websites for the list of 72 pensions, we were not able to determine
if there was a correlation between producing superior returns and having incentive compensation plans in place.” The
report
can
be
found
here:
https://www.wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2018/02-201810241902_WRSJACResponses.pdf. Additionally, Bob Jacksha, CIO of the New Mexico Investment Council, describes the
ineffectiveness of incentive pay by saying, “If the idea is to make people work harder, try harder, I see people working
as hard as they can for a flat compensation.” See “Public CIO pay getting renewed attention,” Pensions & Investments,
July 23, 2018, available at https://www.pionline.com/article/20180723/PRINT/180729976/public-cio-pay-gettingrenewed-attention
28
Bob Jacksha notes, “[f]rom a public relations standpoint, if you give someone a high flat salary, the public might
say you're not earning it, but incentive pay is tied to an outcome.
27
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One channel that could explain our results is that paying a higher level of compensation
enables pension funds to attract more talented CIOs, which we label the hiring channel. We follow
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and use academic institution prestige as a proxy for managerial talent.
To examine this hypothesis, we begin by examining the education of the CIOs of our plans based
on their compensation. Specifically, we sort plans into quartiles based on the compensation paid
to their CIOs. We then examine the average SAT scores and admission rate of the undergraduate
universities that the CIOs attended. The results of this analysis can be found in Panel A of Table
7. The results indicate that plans that pay higher compensation attract CIOs who attended more
selective universities and universities with higher average student SAT scores. Specifically, plans
in top quartile of pay attract managers who attended universities with admission rates (SAT scores)
that are 13.7% lower (64.60 points higher) than the universities attended by managers who are
hired by plans paying bottom quartile compensation. These differences are statistically significant
at the 1% level.
Lastly, we examine whether hiring more talented managers has a positive effect on
performance. We create indicator variables equal to 1 if a CIO attended a university in the top
quartile of average SAT scores (Top Quartile SAT) or in the top quartile of admission selectivity
(Top Quartile Selectivity) and 0 otherwise. We then regress Peer-adjusted Return on these
indicator variables along with the vector of fund-level controls used in the prior regressions.
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel C of Table 7 contain the results. The results indicate that CIOs who
attended more selective universities and those with higher average SAT scores outperform their
peers by 0.184 – 0.261% per year, consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1999). Combined, these
results suggest that higher compensation allows plans to hire more talented managers who, in turn,
positively impact investment performance.
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4.4.3. Does Compensation Affect the Likelihood of a CIO Being Poached?
A large literature in finance and management provides evidence that retaining productive
employees positively affects firm performance (e.g., Khorana, 2001). New managers often make
drastic changes to an organization to implement their own agenda (Li and Scherbina, 2011; Pan
and Wang, 2012). In the context of pension plan management, CIO turnover could lead to costly
portfolio turnover. It could also be the case that having a CIO who is likely to depart may adversely
affect fund performance if that CIO exerts less effort or devotes less attention to his current job. In
this section, we investigate whether compensation impacts a plan’s ability to retain its CIO.
We investigate and classify each instance of CIO turnover in our sample by reading press
releases announcing each event. If the press release suggests the manager is departing for another
public pension plan or a position in a for-profit firm, we classify the turnover as being a poaching.
We then estimate Cox proportional hazard models which predict the probability that a CIO is
poached from a given plan Specifically, we estimate the following regressions:
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0 (𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼 ′ 𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1 )

(2)

where 𝛿𝑖,𝑡−1 includes CIO compensation, past performance, plan size, plan funding, the CIO Local
indicator variable, and the natural logarithm of the CIO’s age as control variables. The regressions
also include year fixed effects to control for the condition of the external labor markets each year.
We present the results of these regressions in Table 7, Panel B.
The results indicate that higher compensation makes it less likely that a CIO gets poached.
Using the coefficient on Top Quartile Compensation in column 2 as our example, paying a CIO
top quartile compensation makes that CIO 45% less likely to leave the plan for an external
opportunity. Interestingly, CIOs who work for better performing and more well-funded plans are
also less likely to be poached, which suggests that CIOs of public pension plans may gain utility
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from feeling like they are part of successful organizations. CIOs are also more likely to be poached
when they work for larger pension plans, consistent with the idea that working at a larger plan
provides these CIOs with greater exposure and publicity.
(Insert Table 7 here)
Next, we examine whether there is a relation between future performance and CIO
retention. As discussed above, both potential and realized turnover may adversely affect future
performance. To examine these possibilities, we calculate four measures of potential or realized
CIO turnover. The measures of potential CIO turnover are the probability estimates we obtain from
Models 1 and 2 in Table 7, Panel B. The first measure of realized turnover is an indicator variable
(CIO Turnover Dummy) equal to 1 for three years from t – 1 to t + 1 around a realized CIO turnover
event and 0 otherwise. The second measure of realized CIO turnover (Cumulative # Turnovers) is
equal to the number of realized CIO turnovers the plan has experienced from 2001 to the present
year.
To test our hypothesis, we augment the regressions in Equation 1 with our turnover
measures described above. The results can be found in Columns 3 through 6 of Panel C in Table
7. The results provide strong support for the idea that turnover adversely affects plan performance.
Specifically, the coefficients on both the predicted and realized turnover measures are all negative
and highly statistically significant. The effects are also economically strong. A one standard
deviation in the likelihood a CIO voluntarily leaves the plan is associated with a 0.143 – 0.146%
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decrease in peer-adjusted returns. Plans whose CIOs depart underperform by 0.272% per year for
the 3 years around the turnover event.29
Combined, the results in Section 4.2 support both the hiring and retention hypotheses.
Conversely, we find little support for the incentives hypothesis. In short, it appears as though CIO
compensation helps public plans attract and retain talented CIOs who in turn bolster plan
performance.

5. The Labor Market for Public Pension Plan CIOs
Our main finding is that higher paid CIOs generate higher investment returns. Specifically,
our results imply that an increase of $350,150 in CIO compensation is associated with 47 – 60 bps
higher investment returns per year. These higher investment returns translate to an additional
$74.91 – 95.63 million of economic value each year for the average plan. It is thus important to
ask why there exists so much heterogeneity in the compensation of public pension plan CIOs and,
specifically, why some plans persistently offer their CIOs low compensation.
5.1. What are the Determinants of CIO Compensation?
To answer this question, we first examine the determinants of CIO compensation. We begin
by regressing the natural logarithm of total CIO compensation on various sets of fixed effects to
gain understanding about whether the variation we observe is driven by time series or crosssectional variation. Specifically, we regress CIO compensation on year fixed effects, plan fixed
effects, and both sets of fixed effects simultaneously to understand whether the variation in

29

In unreported results, we also examine the portfolio turnover using the subsample of plans who report 13F equity
holdings. We find that portfolio turnover also increases around realized CIO turnover events.
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compensation is coming from within or across plans. The results of these regressions can be found
in Columns 1 – 3 of Table 8. We find that the R2 of these regressions are 0.235, 0.747, and 0.917,
respectively, which suggests that most of the variation in CIO compensation is cross-sectional. In
Column 4 of Table 8, we regress compensation on plan fixed effects and a time trend and obtain
an R2 of 0.916, suggesting that the year fixed effects are largely picking up the effect of CIOs being
paid more over time.
Our next goal is to understand which factors are driving the cross-sectional heterogeneity
in compensation we document above. Broadly speaking, we group potential factors into three
categories: plan-level, CIO-level, and location-level variables. For the plan-level variables, we
include the natural logarithm of plan size, the plan’s level of funding, the percentage of the plan’s
board that is made of up plan members, the separate investment board indicator variable, the
average plan member’s salary, and the natural logarithm of the average salary paid to CIOs who
manage plans in the same size quartile.
We include plan size as Gabaix and Landier (2008) show theoretically that CEO
compensation should be directly linked to firm size. We hypothesize that better funded plans will
also be better able to justify paying higher compensation to their CIOs. We expect that the
percentage of the plan’s board that is made of up plan members will be negatively related to CIO
total compensation. Because most public pension plan members’ salaries are well below that of
the CIO, we expect that these board members would act as a constraint against paying high
compensation for reasons of jealousy or political outrage. We expect CIO compensation to be
positively related to the average plan member salary as plan members who are owed more would
presumably want a more talented CIO to manage the plan responsible for paying them their
retirement benefits. Lastly, we expect CIO compensation to be positively related to that of his peer
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group of CIOs. This prediction is motivated by the reports of compensation consulting firms who
use peer group plans when making their recommendations.
We regress CIO compensation on the plan-level variables and year fixed effects in
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 8. We find evidence broadly consistent with most of our predictions.
The coefficients on plan size, plan funding, and peer group compensation are all positive and
highly statistically significant. None of the other coefficients are statistically significant. Perhaps
more importantly, the R2 of the regression in Column 6 is 0.530, which means that these plan-level
variables help explain a sizeable portion of the cross-sectional variation in CIO compensation.
For the CIO-level variables, we include the CIO Local indicator variable, the logarithm of
the CIO’s tenure, and the average SAT of the undergraduate institution the CIO attended. We
include CIO Local because it is possible that, if they are less willing to relocate for a new job, local
CIOs command lower compensation. We include CIO Tenure in the regressions as most
government jobs pay small raises over time. Finally, we include CIO Undergraduate Institution
SAT as our hiring hypothesis, and earlier results, suggest that more talented CIOs command higher
compensation.
We present the results of the regressions of CIO compensation on the CIO-level variables
in Column 7 of Table 8. The results are consistent with each of our predictions. CIOs with longer
tenures and those from more prestigious universities receive statistically higher compensation than
their counterparts. Although it is statistically insignificant, the coefficient on CIO Local is negative
which is consistent with the idea that local CIOs are less likely to bargain for higher compensation.
The R2 of this regression is 0.320, which suggests that CIO-level variables do explain some of the
variation in compensation across plans.
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Finally, we regress compensation on a set of location-level variables derived from the
plans’ headquarters location. First, we obtain cost of living information from AdvisorSmith and
create an indicator variable equal to 1 for cities that are in the top quartile of this index and 0
otherwise. 30 We also create an indicator variable equal to 1 for MSAs in the top quartile of
population and 0 otherwise. We also obtain data on each location’s voting and political preferences
from political scientist Chris Tausanovitch’s website and construct an indicator variable equal to
1 if a location is in the top quartile of Democratic vote share and 0 otherwise. 31 Lastly, we obtain
data on public official corruption convictions from Cordis and Milyo (2016) and construct an
indicator variable equal to 1 for states in the top quartile of public official corruption convictions
and 0 otherwise.
We expect plans in larger, more expensive locations to pay higher compensation to their
CIOs. Our prediction about how political preference will affect compensation is unclear, ex-ante.
On the one hand, it is possible that more conservative locations would prefer to pay lower salaries
in the name of being fiscally responsible. On the other hand, it is possible that more liberal areas
would prefer to pay lower compensation to relative high earners in the name of perceived fairness.
Finally, our rationale for including a measure of corruption in our model is that benefits from
engaging in corruption may serve as a substitute for direct compensation (An and Kweon, 2017;
Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).

30
31

The cost-of-living data can be found here: https://advisorsmith.com/data/coli/#city.
The political voting and preference data can be found here: https://americanideologyproject.com/.
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These results of these regressions can be found in Column 8 of Table 8. We find evidence
consistent with most of our predictions. Cost of living is positively related to CIO compensation,
while both Democratic vote share and level of corruption are negatively related to compensation.
We believe that these results, particularly the result on Democratic vote share, are complementary
to those of Dyck, Manoel, and Morse (2021) who find that political outrage is a key determinant
of public pension plan CIO compensation. The R2 of this regression is 0.392, which suggests that
location-level variables explain some of the variation in compensation across plans.
(insert Table 8 here)
Lastly, in column 9 of Table 8, we regress CIO compensation on all three sets of
independent variables along with the year fixed effects. The most important takeaway from this
test is the R2 of the regression, 0.649, which suggests that we have identified factors that explain
much of the cross-sectional variation in CIO compensation. However, given the R2 of a regression
of compensation on plan and year fixed effects is 0.917, we acknowledge that we have not captured
all the factors that explain CIO compensation.32
The results in this section shed some light on both the sources of the variation in CIO
compensation as well as explanations for the persistent low levels of compensation paid by some
plans. Because characteristics such as a location’s Democratic vote share and culture of corruption

32

In unreported results, we also included other variables in our regressions such as government budget surpluses or
shortfalls and CIO gender and age. None of these variables loaded significantly in any of our models so we excluded
them from our models for the sake of parsimony.
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are relatively static, it appears as though these demand-side frictions help explain the persistently
lower levels of CIO compensation some plans pay.
5.2. Evidence from Labor Market Moves
Lastly, we examine the 23 instances in our sample in which a CIO moves between public
pension plans. We engage in this analysis to uncover whether labor market moves work to resolve
some of the inefficiencies generated by the frictions documented above (e.g., does a talented CIO
who starts in an underpaid position move to a more appropriate position?). We first examine these
CIOs’ compensation before and after their moves and report the results in Panel A of Table 9. We
find strong evidence that CIOs leave their current positions for higher paying jobs. Specifically,
the average CIO leaving his job receives a 100.4% pay raise in new job and zero CIOs leave for a
lower paying job. The 100.4% increase in pay is statistically significant at the 1% level. We also
find that 77% of these CIOs were underpaid, relative to the compensation that would be predicted
by the size of the plans CIOs manage, prior to their moves. After the move, only 46% of these
CIOs remain underpaid. Thus, it does appear that labor market moves resolve some of the
inefficiencies in CIO compensation.
(insert Table 9 here)
Second, we conduct univariate comparisons of the characteristics of CIOs who move
between pensions each year and those that do not. At the time of their moves, CIOs who move
receive lower compensation, are approximately 3.3 years younger, have 2.5-year shorter tenures,
and are 20% less likely to be local. Each of these differences is statistically significant at the 5%
level or better. These results suggest that supply-side frictions appear to hamper CIOs from
resolving some of the inefficiencies in this labor market. Specifically, local CIOs and CIOs more
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likely to have established roots in an area (i.e., older CIOs and those with longer tenures) are likely
less willing to leave their current jobs.
In short, our results provide evidence that there are both supply- and demand-side frictions
which help explain the heterogeneity in CIO compensation. From the supply side, CIOs with a
locational preference or those less willing to uproot their families are less willing to leave even if
doing so would increase their compensation. From the demand side, factors such as the political
environment hinder plans’ abilities to pay higher compensation even if doing so appears to
generate economic value.

6. Conclusion
We document a positive link between higher CIO compensation and public pension plan
investment performance, driven largely by improved allocation decisions, better security selection,
and reduced susceptibility to behavioral biases. From a policy perspective, we are not claiming
that raises in CIO compensation would lead to immediate improvements in plan investment
performance. While increased pay would presumably improve retention outcomes fairly quickly,
the effect that higher compensation has on a plan’s ability to hire a better CIO will not materialize
until the next CIO is hired.33 Furthermore, to the extent elements of plan culture, such as having a
separate investment board, are correlated with CIO compensation and plan performance, any
increase in CIO compensation would ideally be accompanied with changes in plan culture to yield
maximum performance benefits.
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If CIO compensation is indiscriminately increased for an untalented CIO hired under a lower compensation regime,
it may even be counterproductive, leading to increased retention, and a longer tenure for such a CIO.
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Regardless, we interpret our results as indicating that higher CIO compensation, at least in
the long run, would lead to better performance outcomes that generate economic value for plans.
Such performance increases would likely mitigate the underfunding experienced by some public
pension plans. More generally, our study suggests further exploration of the determinants of public
pension plan performance may help identify other cost-effective ways plans could improve
investment performance and thus reduce underfunding.
The seemingly clear economic benefits from increased CIO compensation prompt the
question: why does low CIO compensation persist for some plans? Our results suggest that demand
side frictions, such political considerations, as well as supply side frictions, such as local ties
making it hard for CIOs to move, combine to generate the observed state of the CIO labor market.
We do note that CIO moves work to rectify inefficiencies in this market as moving CIOs are
significantly less likely to be underpaid after they move. These moves, combined with the overall
trend of increasing CIO compensation, suggest that the market is moving slowly towards an
equilibrium in which CIO compensation is higher.
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Figure 1: Relation Between Lagged Compensation and Peer-Adjusted Return
This figure contains a graphical representation of the relation between the lagged CIO compensation and public
pension plan peer-adjusted performance. The figure is generated using Stata’s binscatter function and controls for year
fixed effects.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table contains the summary statistics for the variables used in our study, all of which are tabulated at the plan-year level. Panel A of this table contains
the summary statistics for the chief investment officer variables in our sample. Panel B contains the summary statistics of our pension fund variables. CIO
Total Compensation is the sum of CIO Salary and CIO Bonus. CIO Local is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CIO attended high school or college in
the same state as the plan in which he works and 0 otherwise. CIO Institution SAT and CIO Institution Admit Rate are the average SAT score and the
admission rate of the undergraduate university the CIO attended. CIO Poached is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CIO departs his current plan to take
a job in public pension plan or in a for-profit firm. Plan Size is the market value of the plan’s assets. Funding ratio is the ratio of the plans assets to its
liabilities. Separate Investment Board is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the plan has a separate board responsible for the investment function of a plan
and 0 otherwise. Financial Center is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the plan is headquartered in the financial centers identified by Christoffersen and
Sarkissian (2009) and 0 otherwise. % Allocations are the percentage of the plans’ portfolios that are allocated to each asset class. The return variables are
each individual asset class’ return. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Panel A. Chief Investment Officer Variables

CIO Total Compensation
CIO Salary
CIO Bonus
CIO Local (0/1)
CIO Institution SAT
CIO Institution Admit Rate
CIO Age
CIO Tenure
CIO Fired (0/1)
CIO Poached (0/1)

N

Mean

Std. Dev

10th

25th

Distribution
50th

75th

90th

1,662
1,660
1,660
1,653
1,300
1,332
1,653
1,613
1,612
1,613

$263,191.90
$237,207.90
$25,836.02
0.52
1,281.27
0.53
51.17
6.33
0.011
0.060

$179,132.60
$134,529.60
$82,285.41
0.50
135.26
0.26
8.68
7.51
0.105
0.237

$105,000.00
$104,844.10
$0.00
0.00
1,107.00
0.15
39
0
0
0

$145,113.30
$141,203.90
$0.00
0.00
1,185.00
0.28
45
1
0
0

$207,422.80
$200,000.00
$0.00
1.00
1,270.00
0.59
51
4
0
0

$318,362.00
$300,132.00
$0.00
1.00
1,407.00
0.77
57
8
0
0

$504,854.80
$408,983.20
$69,641.46
1.00
1,461.00
0.82
62
15
0
0
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Panel B. Pension Plan Variables

Plan Size ($mill)
Funding Ratio (%)
Annual Investment Return
Separate Investment Board (0/1)
Financial Center (0/1)
% Allocation Equity
% Allocation Fixed Income
% Allocation Private Equity
% Allocation Hedge Funds
% Allocation Real Estate
% Allocation Commodities
% Allocation Cash
Equity Portfolio Return
Fixed Income Portfolio Return
Private Equity Portfolio Return
Hedge Fund Portfolio Return
Real Estate Portfolio Return
Commodities Portfolio Return
Cash Portfolio Return

N

Mean

Std. Dev

10th

25th

1,662
1,654
1,662
1,655
1,662
1,608
1,608
1,608
1,608
1,608
1,608
1,608
1,419
1,390
1,093
732
1,172
455
710

21,313.97
76.58
6.96
0.26
0.11
51.82%
26.29%
6.55%
4.34%
6.00%
1.67%
1.77%
8.02%
5.16%
11.41%
4.70%
8.97%
3.43%
1.76%

30,437.12
17.82
9.97
0.44
0.31
10.71%
7.69%
5.88%
6.38%
4.48%
3.09%
2.09%
15.73%
4.50%
12.28%
8.85%
12.35%
12.16%
2.26%

1,851.456
55.20
-5.39
0
0
37.10%
17.10%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
-12.37%
-0.10%
-4.40%
-4.80%
-5.00%
-10.66%
0.10%

4,619.496
64.60
1.10
0
0
45.14%
21.30%
0.20%
0.00%
1.90%
0.00%
0.10%
-3.01%
1.62%
7.17%
0.43%
7.10%
-2.30%
0.30%
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Distribution
50th

10,849.42
76.40
9.28
0
0
53.40%
25.20%
6.10%
0.57%
6.10%
0.00%
1.00%
11.87%
5.10%
13.20%
5.60%
10.80%
4.80%
1.00%

75th

90th

23,043.19
88.405
13.91
1
0
59.62%
30.90%
9.92%
6.99%
9.00%
2.04%
2.60%
19.80%
7.60%
18.91%
9.30%
14.60%
10.56%
2.40%

51,936.4
99.10
17.80
1
1
64.30%
36.3%
13.70%
13.40%
11.43%
7.00%
5.00%
24.68%
11.00%
23.80%
13.00%
20.11%
16.27%
5.17%

Table 2: Chief Investment Officer Compensation and Fund Performance
This table reports results of tests that compare the returns of public pension plans based on the compensation of their
chief investment officer (CIO). Plans are assigned to quartiles each year based on their CIO’s compensation. The
performance measure is Peer-Adjusted Return which is the difference of a plan’s return and the average pension plan
return each year. This table reports the results of univariate comparisons of the differences in compensation and peeradjusted returns for the top and bottom quartiles. t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses.
Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Comp. Quartile (t – 1)
1
2
3
4
4-1

Log (Comp.)
11.73***
(671.62)
12.10***
(778.92)
12.44***
(648.87)
13.00***
(583.74)
1.27***
(43.42)

Avg. Comp. ($000s)
131.5***
(57.69)
188.59***
(66.58)
269.96***
(54.20)
481.65***
(47.78)
350.15***
(27.56)
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Peer-Adj. Return (t)
-0.215%**
(-2.20)
-0.028%
(-0.27)
-0.021%
(-0.20)
0.251%**
(2.52)
0.466%***
(3.34)

Table 3: CIO Compensation and Fund Performance Regressions
This table reports results of tests that regress the returns of public pension plans on the compensation of their chief
investment officer (CIO). The performance measure is Peer-Adjusted Return which is the difference of a plan’s return
and the average pension plan return each year. Our main independent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of
the CIO’s total compensation, lagged one year. The other independent variables are as defined in Table 1. The standard
errors are double clustered by plan and year. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.

Log Compensation (t-1)

0.477**
(2.42)

Peer-adjusted Return (t-1)
Log Plan Size (t-1)
Plan Funding % (t - 1)
% Private Equity Allocation
% Equity Allocation
% Fixed Income Allocation
% Hedge Fund Allocation
% Real Estate Allocation
% Commodities Allocation
% Alternatives Miscellaneous
% Cash

Peer-adjusted Return (t)
0.347*
0.289***
(1.89)
(2.95)
0.097
0.052
(1.38)
(0.77)
0.094*
0.012
(1.74)
(0.22)
-0.380
-0.689
(-0.75)
(-1.53)
6.069**
(2.34)
5.369*
(2.01)
0.246
(0.06)
0.056
(0.02)
5.020
(1.45)
-1.407
(-0.35)
6.361***
(4.55)
1.122
(0.27)

Separate Investment Board (0/1)
Top Quartile College (0/1)
Financial Center (0/1)
Year Fixed Effects
Number of Observations
Adj. R-squared

YES
1,141
0.045
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YES
1,141
0.058

YES
1,141
0.115

0.278***
(2.70)
0.045
(0.68)
0.015
(0.27)
-0.657
(-1.39)
6.182**
(2.58)
5.881**
(2.33)
0.898
(0.24)
0.458
(0.15)
6.043*
(1.88)
-0.127
(-0.03)
7.223***
(6.48)
2.126
(0.55)
0.211***
(2.73)
0.096
(0.72)
0.260
(1.11)
YES
1,141
0.120

Table 4: CIO Compensation and Asset Class Allocation and Performance
This table reports results of tests that regress the asset class allocations and asset class returns of public pension plans on the compensation of their chief investment
officer (CIO). The independent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of the CIO’s total compensation, lagged one year. The dependent variables in Panel A
are the percentages of the plan’s assets allocated to various asset classes. The dependent variables in Panel B are the annual returns from investing in each asset
class. The tests contain year fixed effects, and the standard errors are double clustered by plan and year. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. Asset Class Allocations

Log Compensation (t-1)

% Private Equity
0.027***
(3.04)

% Equity
-0.017
(-1.13)

% Fixed Income
-0.009
(-0.87)

% Hedge Funds
-0.006
(-0.69)

% Real Estate
0.019**
(2.66)

% Commodities
-0.008*
(-1.98)

% Cash
-0.003
(-1.38)

YES
1,432
0.196

YES
1,432
0.162

YES
1,432
0.215

YES
1,432
0.183

YES
1,432
0.162

YES
1,432
0.131

YES
1,432
0.049

Year FE
Observations
Adj. R-squared
Panel B. Asset Class Performance

Log Compensation (t-1)

Year FE
Observations
Adj. R-squared

PE Return
0.016**
(2.81)

Eq. Return
0.001
(0.41)

FI Return
0.001
(0.29)

HF Return
-0.005
(-0.71)

RE Return
0.009*
(1.86)

Comm. Return
-0.001
(-0.07)

Cash Return
0.001
(0.90)

YES
961
0.761

YES
1,259
0.985

YES
1,244
0.730

YES
655
0.554

YES
1,028
0.751

YES
400
0.476

YES
620
0.446
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Table 5: Holdings-Based Evidence
This table reports results of tests using the 13F filings of the pension plans in our sample. These tests first sort
plans into quartiles based on their CIO’s compensation each year and then compare the mean of variables
calculated from the plans’ equity holdings. Turnover Ratio is the turnover in the plan’s equity portfolio following
Barber and Odean (2000, 2001). Disposition is calculated following Odean (1998) and is equal to Percentage
Gains Realized minus Percentage Losses Realized. % Lottery Stocks Held is the percentage of the plan’s equity
portfolio that is made up of stocks classified as lottery stocks using the Kumar (2009) definition. The parentheses
below each mean value contain t-statistics and coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Comp. Quartile (t-1)
1
2
3
4
4 -1

Turnover Ratio
31.89%
（12.64）
30.30%
（11.08）
15.94%
（7.08）
21.00%
（9.60）
-10.88%***
（-3.26）

Disposition Effect
-0.091
(-2.30)
0.045
(1.32)
-0.001
(-0.04)
-0.027
(-2.85)
0.054**
(2.08)
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% Lottery Stocks Held
6.41%
(31.87)
4.74%
(18.94)
3.83%
(40.74)
2.84%
(22.51)
-3.57%***
(-9.74)

Table 6: CIO Compensation and Incentives
This table explores the relation between CIO compensation and various types of incentives. Panel A contains
results of linear probability models predicting a CIO’s involuntary departure (e.g., firing). Panel B contains the
results of regressions of plan performance on lagged CIO’s total compensation, measures of incentive
compensation, and various control variables as defined in Table 1. All models contain year fixed effects.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by plan and year, and t-statistics are reported
below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.

Panel A. Are Higher Paid CIOs More Likely to Be Fired for Poor Performance?
CIO Fired = 1
(1)
0.002
(0.29)

Log Compensation (t-1)
Top Quartile Comp (t-1)
Return, Past 3 years
Compensation × Return

Other Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adj. R-squared

(2)

0.442
(0.61)
-0.059
(-1.07)

0.016
(0.51)
-0.211
(-0.92)
-0.273
(-0.85)

YES
YES
1,297
0.008

YES
YES
1,288
0.011

Panel B. Does Incentive Compensation Explain the Outperformance of Higher Paid CIOs?
Peer-Adj. Return (t)
(1)
(2)
0.333***
0.212**
(4.38)
(2.19)
-0.149
(-1.18)
0.200
(1.30)

Log Compensation (t-1)
20% Bonus Dummy
PPS (t-stat >=2)

Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adj. R-squared

YES
YES
1,433
0.056
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YES
YES
901
0.059

Table 7: CIO Compensation, Hiring, and Retention
This table reports results of tests examining the relations between CIO compensation and a pension plan’s ability
to attract and retain talent. Panel A contains the results of univariate comparisons of the undergraduate
institutions attended by managers in different compensation quartiles. Bachelor Institution SAT Score is the
average SAT score for a CIO’s undergraduate institution. Bachelor Institution Admission Rate is the admission
rate for a CIO’s undergraduate institution. Panel B contain the results of Cox proportional hazard models
predicting a CIO being poached. The plan level control variables are defined in Table 1. Panel C contains
regressions of plan performance on measures of talent or retention. The first two columns of Panel C regress
Peer-Adjusted Performance on the two measures of undergraduate institution quality. Columns 3 and 4 regress
Peer-Adjusted Performance on the predicted probability the CIO is poached, as calculated from the hazard
models in Panel B. Columns 5 and 6 regress Peer-Adjusted Performance on Turnover Dummy, an indicator
variable equal to 1 for observations that are in the 3-year period around a realized CIO turnover event, and #
CIO Turnovers, the number of realized CIO turnovers since the beginning of our sample period (2001) until the
current year. Standard errors for all regressions are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by plan and
year, and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and *
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. Do Higher Paid Managers Attend More Prestigious Universities?
Compensation Quartile
1
2
3
4
4–1

Bachelor Institution SAT score
1257.54
1245.72
1301.36
1322.15
64.61***
(6.15)

Compensation Quartile
1
2
3
4
4–1

Bachelor Institution Admission Rate
0.613
0.549
0.486
0.476
-0.138***
(6.44)
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Panel B. Are Higher Paid Managers Less Likely to get Poached?
Failure = CIO Poach
Log Compensation (t – 1)

0.608*
(1.87)

Top Quartile Comp (t – 1)
Peer-adjusted Return (t – 3, t – 1)
Log Plan Size (t – 1)
Plan Funding % (t – 1)
CIO Local (0/1) (t - 1)
Log CIO Age (t - 1)

Year Fixed Effects
Observations

0.005***
(2.81)
1.360***
(2.19)
0.235**
(2.76)
0.799
(1.13)
2.001
(0.86)

0.551**
(2.36)
0.003***
(3.14)
1.301***
(2.74)
0.204**
(2.31)
0.801
(1.12)
1.798
(0.78)

YES

YES

886

855

Panel C. Regressions of Plan Performance on Measures of Talent and Retention
Peer-adjusted Return (t)
Top Quartile SAT (t – 1)

0.263***
(2.86)

Top Quartile Admission (t – 1)

0.211**
(2.23)

Predicted Prob (Model 1)

-2.323***
(-4.91)

Predicted Prob (Model 2)

-0.018***
(-3.12)

Turnover Dummy

-0.268**
(-2.76)

# CIO Turnovers

Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adj. R-squared

-0.112**
(-2.19)
YES
YES
1,668
0.061

YES
YES
2,105
0.048
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YES
YES
800
0.051

YES
YES
763
0.041

YES
YES
2,105
0.052

YES
YES
2,105
0.051

Table 8: Determinants of CIO Compensation
This table reports results of regressions of CIO compensation on plan-, location-, and CIO-level variables and year fixed effects. Plan characteristics include
plan size, level of funding, the percentage of the plan’s board made up of plan members, the presence of a separate investment board, average plan member
salary, and the log of the average peer CIO’s compensation. CIO characteristics include an indicator variable, CIO Local, equal to 1 for CIOs who are
originally from the state in which the plan is located and 0 otherwise, the CIO’s tenure, and the average SAT score of the undergraduate institution the CIO
attended. Location-level variables include indicator variables equal to 1 for plans whose headquarter location are in the top quartiles of i) cost of living
(Top Quartile Cost of Living), ii) population (Top Quartile Population), iii) Democratic vote share (Top Quartile Democratic Vote Share), iv) and public
official corruption convictions (Top Quartile Corruption) from Corlis and Milyo (2016), or zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustered by plan and year, and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and
* are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Log (Compensation)
Fixed Effects Only
Time Trend

Time Trend
0.056***

Plan Chars.

CIO Chars.

Geographic Chars.

All

(16.17)
Plan Size (t - 1)

0.193***

0.098*

0.101**

(5.30)

(2.08)
0.606***

(2.65)
0.127

% Board Members = Plan Participants

(3.36)
0.248

(0.76)
0.219

Separate Investment Board (0/1)

(1.34)
0.104

(1.27)
0.217**

Average Plan Member Salary

(1.09)
-0.042

(2.45)
-0.117*

(-0.48)
0.451***

(-1.80)
0.367***

Plan Funding (t - 1)

Log (Peer Group Salary Average)

(3.40)
-0.052

(3.31)
0.011

CIO Tenure

(-0.69)
0.014**

(0.18)
0.009**

CIO Undergraduate Institution SAT

(2.31)
0.101***

(2.22)
0.063***

CIO Local (0/1)

(3.18)
0.315**

(3.17)
0.215***

Top Quartile Population (0/1)

(2.62)
-0.016

(2.97)
0.137

Top Quartile Dem. Vote Share (0/1)

(-0.11)
-0.247*

(1.03)
-0.166*

(-1.75)
-0.330***

(-2.05)
-0.302***
(-3.72)
YES

Top Quartile Cost of Living (0/1)

Top Quartile Corruption (0/1)
Year FE

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

(-3.57)
YES

Plan FE
Observations

NO
967

YES
967

YES
967

YES
967

NO
967

NO
967

NO
967

NO
967

NO
967

0.235

0.747

0.917

0.916

0.416

0.530

0.320

0.392

0.649

R-squared
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Table 9: CIO Labor Market Dynamics
This table reports results from tests examining the labor market dynamics of public pension plan CIOs. Panel A
contains the comparison of the compensation the subsample of CIOs who move between public pension plans
in our sample receive before and after their moves. Panel B contains the results of univariate t-tests comparing
characteristics of the sample of CIOs who move to another plan in our sample versus those who do not. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by plan and year, and t-statistics are reported below the
coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Panel A. CIO Compensation Before and After Job Changes
CIO Total Compensation
Underpaid

Before
$167,847.4
0.77

After
$312,062.8
0.46

% Change
100.45***
0.31**

Non-Movers
12.30
0.51
$264,946
50.95
6.63
0.49

Difference
-0.31***
-0.26***
-$95,665***
-3.32**
-2.47***
-0.20**

Panel B. Characteristics of Moving and Non-Moving CIOs
Log CIO Compensation
Underpaid (0/1)
CIO Total Compensation ($)
CIO Age
CIO Tenure
CIO Local (0/1)

Movers
11.99
0.77
$169,280
47.63
4.16
0.29
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Online Appendix:
Paying for Performance in Public Pension Plans
This appendix contains the following tables:
1. The specific plan-years that compose our sample.
2. Regressions that mitigate concerns about the specification of our models and reverse
causality.
3. Regressions of various risk-taking measures on manager compensation
4. Regressions which include potential omitted variables added individually.
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Table A1: Sample Description.
This table contains the list of pension plans for which we obtained CIO compensation data as well as the years for which we have this compensation
information.
State

Plan

Years

State

Plan

Years

CT

Hartford MERF

2001-2018

AL

Alabama ERS/TRS

2001-2018

CT

Connecticut SERS/TRS/Municipal

2003-2018

AK

Alaska PERS/TRS

2017-2018

DE

Delaware State Employees

2008-2018

AZ

Arizona Public Safety/Corrections Officers

2013-2018

DC

DC Police & Fire/Teachers

2011-2017

AZ

Arizona SRS

2001-2018

FL

Florida RS

AZ

Phoenix ERS

2014-2018

FL

Jacksonville ERS

AR

Arkansas PERS

GA

Georgia ERS/TRS

2001-2018

AR

Arkansas Teachers

HI

Hawaii ERS

2001-2018

CA

California PERF

2001-2018

ID

Idaho PERS

2001-2018

CA

California Teachers

2001-2018

IL

Illinois Teachers

2001-2018

CA

Kern County ERS

2001-2018

IL

Illinois Municipal

2005-2018

CA

Orange County ERS

2001-2018

IL

Illinois Universities

2006-2018

CA

Sacramento County ERS

2001-2018

IL

Chicago Police

2009-2018

CA

San Francisco City & County ERS

2002-2018

IL

Illinois SERS

2014-2018

CA

Alameda County ERS

2002-2018

IL

Chicago Teachers

2016-2018

CA

Los Angeles Fire and Police

2004-2018

IL

Chicago Municipal

CA

Los Angeles ERS

2005-2018

IL

Cook County ERS

CA

San Diego City ERS

2009-2018

IN

Indiana PERF

2001-2018

CA

Contra Costa ERA

IN

Indiana Teachers

2001-2018

CA

LA County ERS

IA

Iowa PERS

2001-2018

CA

San Diego County

KS

Kansas PERS

2001-2018

CA

University of California

KY

Kentucky ERS/County

2001-2018

CA

Los Angeles Water and Power

KY

Kentucky Teachers

2001-2018

CO

Denver Employees

2001-2018

LA

Louisiana Teachers

2001-2018

CO

Colorado PERA

2005-2018

2004-2018
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State

Plan

Years

State

Plan

Years

LA

Louisiana Schools

2001-2018

NY

NY State Teachers

2004-2018

LA

Louisiana SERS

2001-2018

NY

NYC TRS/Fire/Police/ERS

2008-2018

LA

Louisiana Municipal Police

NY

NY State & Local ERS/Police & Fire

LA

Louisiana State Parochial Employees

NC

North Carolina Local Govt/Teachers/SERS

LA

New Orleans ERS

ND

North Dakota PERS/TRS

2001-2018

ME

Maine Local/State/Teachers

2001-2018

OH

Ohio School Employees

2012-2018

MD

Maryland PERS/TRS

2005-2018

OH

Ohio PERS

2010-2018

MD

Montgomery County Maryland ERS

2014-2018

OH

Ohio Teachers

2014-2018

MA

Boston RS

2001-2018

OH

Ohio Police & Fire

2013-2018

MA

Massachusetts SRS/TRS

2005-2018

OK

Oklahoma PERS

2001-2018

MI

Michigan Municipal

2001-2018

OK

Oklahoma Teachers

2001-2018

MI

Michigan Public Schools

2001-2018

OK

Oklahoma Police

2005-2018

MI

Michigan SERS

2001-2018

OR

Oregon PERS

MI

Detroit Police and Fire

PA

Pennsylvania School Employees

2001-2018

MI

Detroit General RS

PA

Pennsylvania State ERS

2001-2018

MN

Duluth Teachers

PA

Pennsylvania Municipal

2012-2018

MN

Minneapolis ERF

2014-2018

PA

Philadelphia Municipal

2016-2018

MN

Minnesota GERF/Police & Fire/TRS/SERS

2014-2018

RI

Rhode Island ERS/Municipal

2001-2018

MS

Mississippi PERS

2001-2018

SC

South Carolina Police & RS

2010-2018

MO

Missouri SERS

2001-2018

SD

South Dakota RS

2019-2018

MO

Missouri DOT and Highway

2006-2018

TN

Tennessee Political/State & Teachers

MO

Missouri Local

TN

Nashville-Davidson ERS

MO

Missouri PEERS/TRS

TX

Austin ERS

2001-2018

MT

Montana PERS/TRS

TX

Texas County & District

2001-2018

NE

Nebraska Schools

2011-2018

TX

Texas Teachers

2001-2018

NE

Omaha Police and Fire

2017-2018

TX

Texas Municipal

2003-2018

NV

Nevada Police & Fire/Regular Employees

2001-2018

TX

Texas ERS

2006-2018

NH

New Hampshire RS

2001-2018

TX

Texas LECOS

2006-2018

NJ

New Jersey PERS/Police & Fire/TRS

2001-2018

TX

Houston Firefighters

2008-2018

NM

New Mexico Educational

2011-2018

TX

Dallas Police and Fire

2014-2018
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State

Plan

Years

UT

Utah Noncontributory/Public Safety

2016-2018

VT

Vermont State Employees/Teachers

2015-2017

VA

Fairfax County Schools

VA

Virginia RS

WA

2001-2018

WA

Seattle ERS
Washington Law
Enforcement/PERS/SERS/TRS

WV

West Virginia PERS/Teachers

2001-2018

WI

Wisconsin RS

2001-2018

WI

Milwaukee City ERS

2001-2018

WY

Wyoming Public Employees

2010-2018

2006-2018
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Table A2: Alternate Specifications & Reverse Causality
This table reports results of regressions which use alternative versions of CIO compensation as our main
independent variables of interest. The dependent variable for all regressions is Peer-Adjusted Return. In Panel
A, we use indicator variables for each compensation quartile or an above or below median compensation
indicator variable instead of the continuous compensation variable. Panel B contains regressions of various
return measures on compensation lagged two years to mitigate concerns that future performance explains current
compensation. The parentheses below each coefficient contain t-statistics computed from standard errors that
are double clustered by plan and year. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.

Panel A. Reverse Causality, Compensation Lagged Two Years
Log Compensation (t – 2)
Peer-adjusted Return (t – 1)
Log Plan Size (t – 1)
Plan Funding % (t – 1)
% Equity Allocation (t – 1)
% Fixed Income Allocation (t – 1)
% Private Equity Allocation (t – 1)
% Hedge Fund Allocation (t – 1)
% Real Estate Allocation (t – 1)

Year FE
Observations
R-squared

Peer-Adjusted Return (t)
0.216**
(2.32)
0.035
(0.53)
0.042
(1.14)
-0.580
(-1.61)
1.506
(0.62)
-3.401
(-1.16)
0.481
(0.79)
-3.922*
(-1.73)
0.880
(0.32)

Raw Return (t)
0.210**
(2.07)
0.055
(0.91)
0.076***
(3.39)
-0.537
(-1.04)
1.026
(0.35)
-1.446
(-0.49)
-0.037
(-0.03)
-3.477
(-1.43)
0.619
(0.22)

Sharpe (t to t + 3)
0.100**
(2.13)
-0.002
(-0.24)
-0.010
(-0.37)
-0.039
(-0.33)
0.023
(0.08)
0.640*
(2.13)
1.235**
(2.26)
-0.583
(-1.38)
-0.500
(-0.58)

YES
1,035
0.061

YES
1,031
0.951

YES
740
0.819
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Panel B. Alternative Performance Measures

Log Compensation (t-1)
Peer-adjusted Return (t-1)
Log Fund Size (t-1)
Plan Funding % (t - 1)
% Equity Allocation
% Fixed Income Allocation
% Private Equity Allocation
% Hedge Fund Allocation
% Real Estate Allocation

Year Fixed Effects
Number of Observations
Adj. R-squared
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Raw Return
(1)
0.327***
(3.34)
0.069
(0.89)
0.049
(1.58)
-0.767*
(-1.80)
2.192
(0.92)
-0.540
(-0.20)
1.712*
(2.06)
-3.552
(-1.55)
1.996
(0.93)

Sharpe Ratio (t to t + 3)
(2)
0.073*
(1.81)
0.000
(0.02)
-0.003
(-0.13)
0.000
(0.00)
-0.067
(-0.24)
0.462
(1.63)
0.949
(1.71)
-0.598
(-1.49)
0.052
(0.09)

YES
1,428
0.955

YES
1,061
0.823

Panel C. Alternative Regression Specifications
Peer-Adjusted Return
2nd Quartile Comp (t – 1)

0.120
(1.43)
0.247**
(2.42)
0.411***
(4.19)

3rd Quartile Comp (t – 1)
Top Quartile Comp (t – 1)

0.257**
(2.65)

Above Median Comp (t – 1)
Peer-adjusted Return (t – 1)
Log Plan Size (t – 1)
Plan Funding % (t – 1)
% Equity Allocation (t – 1)
% Fixed Income Allocation (t – 1)
% Private Equity Allocation (t – 1)
% Hedge Fund Allocation (t – 1)
% Real Estate Allocation (t – 1)

Year Fixed Effects
Number of Observations
Adj. R-squared
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0.069
(0.95)
0.040
(1.31)
-0.775*
(-2.01)
1.787
(0.87)
-1.558
(-0.67)
0.998
(1.62)
-3.837*
(-1.87)
2.255
(1.00)

0.071
(0.97)
0.062*
(1.76)
-0.698*
(-1.79)
1.680
(0.83)
-1.571
(-0.68)
1.139*
(1.95)
-3.871*
(-1.89)
2.332
(1.03)

0.254**
(2.76)
0.070
(0.97)
0.051*
(1.89)
-0.725*
(-1.87)
1.704
(0.84)
-1.656
(-0.71)
0.929
(1.49)
-3.991*
(-1.95)
2.342
(1.05)

YES
1,423
0.051

YES
1,423
0.051

YES
1,423
0.052

Table A3: Holdings-Based Evidence on Risk-Taking
This table reports results of tests using the 13F filings of the pension plans in our sample. These tests first sort
plans into quartiles based on their CIO’s compensation and then compare mean differences of measures of risk
calculated using the plan’s equity holdings. Specifically, for each plan that files Form 13F, we use the plan’s
portfolio holdings to infer its daily, or monthly, returns. We then regress these inferred returns on the risk and
behavioral factors listed below. Lastly, we regress the betas from these regressions on the log of CIO
compensation, lagged one year as well as plan size, funding, and past performance. Panel A contains measures
of volatility or economic policy risk. VIX and VXO are computed following . CATFIN is from Allen, Bali, and
Tang (2012). MACRO is from Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014). POLICY is the economic policy uncertainty
index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Panel B contains measures of tail risk or behavioral factors. VaR is
the value at risk factor, calculated by . CoVaR is the conditional value-at-risk measure, calculated by . PEAD
and FIN are the behavior factors of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2020). Panel C contains measures of mispricing.
MAX and IVOL are from . Mispricing Score is the stock-level measure of mispricing from Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan (2015). Finally, we compute Total Volatility and Sharpe Ratio using the daily portfolio returns inferred
from a plan’s equity holdings. The parentheses below each coefficient contain t-statistics computed from
standard errors that are double clustered by plan and year. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. Volatility and Economic Policy Risk
VIX

VXO

CATFIN

MACRO

POLICY

Log Compensation (t-1)

-0.025**
(-2.08)

-0.024*
(-1.83)

-0.029***
(-2.88)

-0.022***
(-4.99)

-0.003*
(-1.93)

Plan Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
R-squared
Number of Observations

YES
YES
0.168
1084

YES
YES
0.114
1084

YES
YES
0.644
263

YES
YES
0.442
263

YES
YES
0.509
263

Panel B. Tail Risk and Behavioral Factors
VaR

CoVaR

PEAD

FIN

Log Compensation (t-1)

-0.004***
(-3.65)

-0.005***
(-3.33)

-0.029***
(-2.88)

-0.004***
(-3.65)

Plan Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
R-squared
N

YES
YES
0.510
1084

YES
YES
0.486
1084

YES
YES
0.644
263

YES
YES
0.510
1084
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Panel C. Risk/Behavior/Mispricing Factors
MAX

IVol

Mispricing
Score

Total
Volatility

Sharpe Ratio

Log Compensation (t-1)

-0.081***
(-4.43)

-2.096*
(-1.86)

-0.028
(-1.69)

-0.005**
(-2.11)

3.281***
(3.06)

Plan Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
R-squared
N

YES
YES
0.293
1084

YES
YES
0.376
1084

YES
YES
0.143
1084

YES
YES
0.464
1084

YES
YES
0.348
1084
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Table A4: Omitted Variables
This table reports results of regressions which control for various omitted variables. The dependent variable for
all regressions is Peer-Adjusted Return. In Panel A, we control for plan culture using Separate Investment Board,
an indicator variable equal to 1 for plans which have a separate board tasked with overseeing the CIO’s
investments. In Panel B, we control for plan location using Financial Center, an indicator variable equal to 1 if
the plan is headquartered in one of the 6 financial centers used in Christofferson and Sarkissian (2009). Top
Quartile MSA is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the pension plan is headquartered in a MSA that is the top
quartile of our sample. For each variable, we estimate regressions in which we control for the variable as well
as split our sample based on each variable and estimate our main regression for each subsample. The parentheses
below each coefficient contain t-statistics computed from standard errors that are double clustered by plan and
year. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. Separate Investment Board/Fund Culture

Log Compensation (t-1)
Separate Investment Board (0/1)

Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
Adj. R-Squared
Number of Observations

0.307***
(5.57)
0.235**
(2.17)
YES
YES
0.055
1,428

Peer-Adjusted Return (t)
Sep. Invt. Board = 1 Sep. Invt. Board = 0
0.689**
0.221**
(2.88)
(2.62)

YES
YES
0.067
361

YES
YES
0.049
1,067

Panel B. Financial Center/Plan Location

Log Compensation (t-1)
Financial Center (0/1)

0.321***
(5.29)
0.176
(1.08)
YES
YES
0.053
1,433

Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
Adj. R-Squared
Number of Observations
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Peer-Adjusted Return (t)
Fin. Center = 1
Fin. Center = 0
1.425**
0.271**
(2.66)
(4.90)

YES
YES
0.151
159

YES
YES
0.069
1,274

Panel C. Big City/Plan Location

Log Compensation (t-1)
Top Quartile MSA (0/1)

Control Variables
Year Fixed Effects
Adj. R-Squared
Number of Observations

0.287***
(5.24)
-0.032
(-0.30)
YES
YES
0.052
1,423
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Peer-Adjusted Return (t)
Top Quartile MSA = 1 Top Quartile MSA = 0
0.448**
0.258**
(2.88)
(3.81)

YES
YES
0.079
311

YES
YES
0.048
1,112

